Found it........the important section is near the bottom under the section that reads "Order" - I tried to highlight it but it's not working.. I haven't read this entire ruling......
Cite as Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F.Supp.
602 (D.N.J. 1990)
COALITION OF NEW JERSEY SPORTSMEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
James J. FLORIO, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 90-2992(GEB).
United States District Court, D. New Jersey.
Aug. 15, 1990.
Evan F. Nappen, Eatontown, N.J., for plaintiffs.
Robert J. Del Tufo, Atty. Gen. of N.J., Benjamin Clarke
(argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law & Public Safety, Trenton,
N.J., for defendants.
OPINION
GARRETT E. BROWN, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiffs in this action [footnote 1] have brought suit
against the Governor of New Jersey, the Attorney General of New
Jersey, the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, and the
Prosecutor of Mercer County as prosecutor and as a representative
of the class of county prosecutors in the State of New Jersey,
seeking to strike down as unconstitutional portions of New Jersey's
newly amended gun control law, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1 et seq. The matter
is now before the Court on a motion by plaintiffs for a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the purportedly
unconstitutional provisions. The Court has had the benefit of
able, thorough, and helpful briefing and oral argument by counsel
for both sides.
Plaintiffs raise three challenges to the statute. First, they
challenge the newly enacted ban on large capacity magazines,
NJ.S.A. 2C:39-36) (banning possession) and N.J.S.A, 2C:39-9(h)
(banning manufacture, transport, shipment, sale, or disposal).
[footnote 2] They contend that the law unconstitutionally
criminalizes the possession or transfer of large capacity magazines
without providing owners of such magazines an opportunity to
conform with the new law before being subjected to its penalties.
Second, they argue that the ban on large capacity magazines and
regulation of semiautomatic, "assault firearms," N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(f) (possession) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(g) (manufacture, transport,
shipment, sale or disposal), are preempted by federal law to the
extent these provisions prohibit the sale of air guns and
"traditional" B-B guns, in violation of 15 U.S.C. section
5001(g)(ii). Third, they contend that federal law providing for
the interstate transport of unloaded, inaccessible firearms, 18
U.S.C. section 926A, preempts the newly amended law to the extent
that the new law exposes to criminal prosecution people who
transport weapons through New Jersey in accordance with the federal
law.
The Attorney General has cross-moved for dismissal of all the
above claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the alternative, and as to
the first claim only, the Attorney General asks this Court to
abstain under the doctrine enunciated in Railroad Comm'n of Texas
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
The Attorney General concedes that, under the Third Circuit's
decision in United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356 (3d
Cir.1986), Pullman abstention is inappropriate when a federal court
is faced with questions of federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause. See id. at 363-64.
Before this Court may issue a preliminary injunction,
plaintiffs must show a reasonable probability of success on the
merits, and that they will suffer irreparable injury pendente lite
if relief is not granted. The Court also must consider the
possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or
denial of the injunction, and the public interest. In re Arthur
Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir.1982).
For the following reasons, the Court will abstain as to plaintiffs'
first claim, grant preliminary injunctive relief on the second
claim, and dismiss the third.
I. THE LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINE BAN
New Jersey's newly enacted ban on the possession, sale,
manufacture, disposal, shipment, or transport of large capacity
magazines became effective on March 30, 1990, the date Governor
Florio signed the bill into law. Plaintiffs argue that, with the
stroke of a pen, previously law-abiding owners of such magazines
instantly became criminals without being given an opportunity
lawfully to conform their conduct with the new law. Plaintiffs
seek a preliminary injunction to protect themselves from the threat
of prosecution.
The Attorney General contends that the immediate effective
date of the large capacity magazine ban does not render the
provision constitutionally infirm because New Jersey's voluntary
surrender statute provides an opportunity for owners of such
magazines lawfully to turn in such items without fear of
prosecution. The statute provides:
No person shall be convicted of all offense under this
chapter for possessing any firearms, weapons, destructive de-
vices, silencers or explosives, if after giving written notice
of his intention to do so, including the proposed date and
time of surrender, he voluntarily surrendered the weapon,
device, instrument or substance in question to the
superintendent or to the chief of police in the municipality
in which he resides, provided that the required notice is
received by the superintendent or chief of police before any
charges have been made or complaints filed against such person
for the unlawful possession of the weapon, device, instrument
or substance in question and before any investigation has been
commenced by any law enforcement agency concerning the
unlawful possession. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as granting immunity from prosecution for any crime
or offense except that of the unlawful possession of such
weapons, devices, instruments or substances surrendered as
herein provided.
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12.
Plaintiffs respond that the voluntary surrender statute is
inadequate for three alternative reasons: 1) magazines are neither
"firearms, weapons, destructive devices, silencers or explosives,"
the only items covered by the statute; 2) even if magazines were
considered "weapons," [footnote 3] the voluntary surrender
provisions would immunize owners only from possessory offenses, not
manufacture, shipment, disposal, transport, or sale, which are
proscribed under N.J. S.A. 2C:39-9(h); and 3) even if owners of
large capacity magazines could turn them in without fear of
prosecution, the uncompensated voluntary surrender of such property
would result in an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth
Amendment.
Before reaching the merits of these arguments, however, the
Court first must consider whether to abstain. Although, as a
general rule, the federal courts are bound to adjudicate cases
within their jurisdiction, Pullman abstention is appropriate when
"questions under both state law and the federal constitution are
present," and abstention forwards the policies of "promoting comity
with the state courts and ensuring the smooth functioning of the
federal judiciary." Hughes v. Lipscher, 906 F.2d 961, 967 (3d
Cir.1990). Pullman abstention also is appropriate where the state
court's resolution of an unsettled question of state law may moot
or change the analysis of the federal constitutional issue.
Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1089 (3d Cir.1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 1229, 89 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986).
Although application of Pullman abstention is discretionary
with the Court, the Third Circuit requires three special circum-
stances as prerequisites:
(1) Uncertain issues of state law underlying the federal
constitutional claims brought in the district court;
(2) Amenability of the state law issues to a state court
interpretation that would obviate the need for, or
substantially narrow, adjudication of the federal claims;
[and]
(3) Disruption of important state policies through a federal
court's erroneous construction of state law.
Hughes, at 968. Once these elements are present, a district court
must next determine "whether abstention is appropriate, considering
such factors as the availability of an adequate state remedy, the
length of time the litigation has been pending, and the potential
impact on the parties from the delay in seeking a state ruling."
Id.
All the factors in favor of Pullman abstention are present in
regard to plaintiffs' claim regarding the large capacity magazine
ban. First, the uncertain issue of state law underlying the
constitutional claim is the interaction between the voluntary
surrender statute and the ban on large capacity magazines. The New
Jersey courts have not had the opportunity to interpret either
statute, alone or in combination. Second, state court
interpretation of these statutes will materially alter this Court's
constitutional analysis. If the state court interprets the
voluntary surrender statute as not providing a remedy for large
capacity magazine owners, this Court must consider whether the
statute is constitutionally deficient for insufficient notice. If
the state court interprets the voluntary surrender statute to the
contrary, this Court must determine whether such a remedy effects
an unconstitutional taking, rather than a valid exercise of the
police power. Third, gun control and regulation is an important
state policy that would be disrupted if this Court were to construe
state law erroneously.
Other factors also favor abstention at this time. At oral
argument, defendants indicated that they will move promptly to seek
a decision in the state courts, and there is no indication that
those courts would not promptly and adequately resolve the
questions presented. The present action has been pending for only
a few weeks, and the Court does not foresee any potential adverse
impact on the parties from a reasonable delay in seeking a state
ruling. The Attorney General has taken the position in open court
that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-12 does in fact provide for the voluntary
surrender of large capacity magazines and this Court has no reason
to anticipate that the chief law enforcement officer of the State
of New Jersey would change his position and authorize prosecution
of those individuals who voluntarily surrendered such magazines for
the possession thereof. Moreover, any claimed uncompensated
"taking" as a result of voluntary surrender could not be
irreparable because, even assuming such a taking was not a valid
exercise of the police power, plaintiffs could be made whole
through monetary compensation.
Plaintiffs assert that the immunity provided by the voluntary
surrender statute is inadequate because it would not immunize them
from prosecution for manufacture, sale, disposal, shipment, or
transport of large capacity magazines. Were the State to attempt
to prosecute plaintiffs for manufacture, sale, or transport of such
items based solely upon a voluntary surrender pursuant to the
statute, the scope of the state immunity, and any constitutional
questions presented thereby, would best be resolved in the state
forum, and are too speculative to be dealt with here.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION RE: B-B AND AIR PELLET GUNS
Plaintiffs correctly assert that the New Jersey statute's
definition of semi-automatic shotguns may include certain B-B and
pellet-firing air guns. New Jersey law defines a shotgun as, among
other things, "any firearm designed to be fired from the shoulder
which does not fire fixed ammunition." N.J.S.A. 2C:391(n). B-B
guns and pellet-firing air guns fall within the statutory
definition of firearms. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f). Also, neither B-
B nor pellet-firing air guns fire fixed ammunition-i.e., ammunition
encased in an explosive cartridge which propels the round. Thus,
semiautomatic B-B and pellet-firing air guns designed to be fired
from the shoulder and which have either a magazine of more than six
rounds, a pistol grip, or a folding stock, would be classified as
assault firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w)(3). Moreover, any semi-
automatic B-B or pellet guns that had non-detachable magazines in
excess of fifteen rounds would fall within the statutory definition
of large capacity magazines. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(y). [footnote
4]
The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the language in 15
U.S.C. section 5001(g), that "no state shall-(ii) prohibit (other
than prohibiting the sale to minors) the sale of traditional B-B,
paint-ball, or pellet-firing air guns that expel a projectile
through the force of air pressure," conflicts with the New Jersey
statute. At the outset, it is important to understand the
distinction between B-B guns and air-powered pellet guns. [footnote
5] "B-B" refers to the smallest calibre of shot. The B-B is ball-
shaped, and made of lead, lead alloy, or steel. B-Bs need not be
propelled by air: they may, for instance, be propelled by a spring
mechanism. It appears that B-Bs generally are fired from
smoothbore barrels. In contrast, a pellet may be one of three
higher calibres, .117 [sic] cal., 5 mm, or .22 cal. The pellet is
a nonspherical, semi-hollow projectile made of lead or lead alloy.
When fired from an air gun, the gases in the barrel cause the
pellet to expand and grip the rifling in the barrel. The rifling
causes the pellet to spin and thereby produces a more accurate shot
than the B-B. Thus, the term "B-B gun" refers only to the calibre
and type of projectile the gun fires, whereas a "pellet-firing air
gun that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure"
refers not only to the projectile, but to the means of propelling
it.
The defendants argue that the word "traditional" must be read
as modifying B-B, paint-ball, and pellet-firing air guns, despite
the use of the disjunctive "or" in the statute. They further
contend that, in using the word "traditional," the Congress meant
to refer only to single-shot B-B and pellet-firing air guns, not
semiautomatic ones. However, the statute's plain language,
legislative history, and subsequent interpretation by the
Department of Commerce suggests a contrary construction.
The most apparent contradiction in defendants' position can be
found in the express language of the statute. For the term
"traditional" to modify both B-B and pellet-firing air guns, the
term logically must also apply to paint-ball guns. According to
the Congressional Record, paint-ball guns fire "projectiles for
marking trees, or paintball games or other similar purposes." 134
Cong.Rec. S15531 (daily ed. October 11, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Dole); 134 Cong. Rec. H10071 (daily ed. October 12, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Dingell). Such devices are of comparatively
recent origin and plaintiffs have asserted without opposition that
there are no "traditional" paint-ball guns, and that those used for
paintball games are a relatively new development. [footnote 6]
The strongest indicia of congressional intent, however, are
section 5001's enabling regulations established by the Department
of Commerce at 15 C.F.R. section 1150.1-1150.5. [footnote 7] In 15
C.F.R. section 1150.1, Commerce interprets "traditional B-B, paint-
ball, or pellet-firing air guns" as those guns that are described
in American Society for Testing and Materials standard F 589-85,
Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Non-Powder Guns (June
28, 1985). Section 1.1, which defines the scope of the
specifications, expressly covers "non-powder guns. commonly
referred to as BB guns, air, guns, and pellet guns, which propel a
projectile by means of energy released by compressed air,
compressed gas, mechanical spring action, or a combination there-
of...." Id. In adopting this definition, Commerce thereby gave a
very broad reading to the preemptive provisions of section 5001(g),
for section 1.1 appears to cover all B-B and pellet guns, so long
as the guns do not use gunpowder to propel their rounds.
Conmerce's interpretation is reasonable, and the defendants have
provided no evidence to the contrary. [footnote 8]
Further support for this interpretation may be found in the
legislative history of section 5001. The Senate introduced section
5001 as an amendment to the House amendments to Senate Bill 1382,
the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act. The amendment,
entitled "Penalties for Entering Into Commerce of Imitation
Firearms," required that toy, look-alike or imitation firearms have
a blaze orange plug affixed in their barrels recessed no more than
6 millimeters from the muzzle end of the barrel. [footnote 9] The
bill was introduced on the impetus of the Hobby and Toy Industry or
America and the Toy Manufacturers of America. 134 Cong.Rec. S15531
(daily ed. October 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dole). [footnote
10] The purpose of the bill was expressed in the House debate:
The potential hazards and misuses of an object that
resembles a deadly weapon ought to be evident to everyone, A
person threatened with such an object can scarcely conduct a
detailed examination to determine whether it is in fact real.
Similarly, a police officer can hardly be expected to make a
detailed inquiry concerning just how real the object in the
hands of an adversary is before firing his gun. For these
reasons, misuse of toy guns presents a real hazard and a prob-
lem that needs to be addressed.
134 Cong.Rec. H10071 (daily ed. October 12, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Moorhead).
Express reference as to the meaning of the terms "traditional
B-B, paint-ball, or pellet firing air gun" appears in the statement
of Senator Dole of Kansas:
B-B or pellet firing air guns such as those made by the
Daisy Manufacturing Co. and Crosman air guns are also ex-
empted. Similarly, the provision does not intend that paint-
pellet guns firing projectiles for marking trees, or paintball
games or other similar purposes such as those manufactured by
the Nelson Paint Co. be covered.
134 Cong.Rec. S15531 (daily ed. October 11, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Dole); accord, 134 Cong.Rec. H10071 (daily ed. October 12,
1988) (statement of Rep. Dingell). These comments expressly
identify Daisy B-B guns and air guns, as well as Crosman air guns,
as examples of guns exempt from state regulations prohibiting their
sale. In the absence of any contrary indicia of congressional
intent, it appears that the exception carved out for air guns
applied, inter alia, to all air guns made by Daisy and Crosman at
the time the legislation was enacted.
Defendants have submitted the affidavit of Peter Harvey,
Special Assistant Attorney General, who avers that Daisy and
Crosman representatives indicated to him that, with one exception,
none of their airpowered or B-B rifles are semi-automatic. In
opposition, plaintiffs have submitted recent catalog advertisements
for various semi-automatic air rifles, albeit rifles manufactured
by companies other than Crosman or Daisy, [footnote 11] as well as
semi-automatic pistols with magazines in excess of fifteen rounds.
Some of these pistols are made by Crosman and Daisy, [footnote 12]
and would be banned under New Jersey's prohibition on large
capacity magazines. The Court finds, therefore, that the Congress
intended to remove from the states the power to prohibit the sale
of such B-B and air-powered pellet guns as are covered under the
New Jersey statute.
Having determined that the New Jersey statute regulates a
class of firearms that falls within the preemptive provisions of
section 5001(g), the Court next considers whether the statute
constitutes a prohibition on the sale of such firearms. In the
case of semi-automatic air pistols with a non-detachable magazine
exceeding fifteen rounds, the prohibition is express. In the case
of a person wishing to purchase semiautomatic air rifles classified
as assault firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w)(3), the prohibition
is de facto, for that person must go through the extremely rigorous
qualification process required for receiving a license to own a
machine gun.
To receive a license for air rifles fitting the definition of
semi-automatic shotguns, the applicant first must be qualified to
carry a handgun under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. [footnote 13] The applicant
then must file with the New Jersey Superior Court a written
application, setting forth in detail the reasons for desiring such
a license. The Superior Court thereafter refers the application to
the county prosecutor for investigation and recommendation. Based
upon the recommendation, the Superior Court may grant the license
only upon an express finding that the public safety and welfare so
require. The Superior Court also may place any conditions and
limitations on the license as it deems in the public interest.
Applicants must pay a $76 application fee with each application.
Any issued license, may be valid for no more than two years. Once
the license expires, the applicant must reapply as if he or she
were applying for the first time. See N.J.S.A. 2C:68-5.
These restrictions are so substantial that they create a de
facto prohibition on the sale of B-B and air guns that may fall
under New Jersey's statutory definition of semi-automatic firearms.
Any potential owner must qualify under two lengthy application
procedures, and may be refused at any time the State determines
such a license does not serve the public interest. This regulatory
scheme vests unbridled discretion over the licensing process with
the State.
In sum, plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that
New Jersey's ban on large capacity magazines and regulation of
semi-automatic assault weapons are preempted by federal law to the
extent they prohibit the sale of traditional B-B and pellet-firing
air guns. Plaintiffs also have demonstrated the possibility of
irreparable injury, because owners of such firearms and large
capacity magazines face the threat of prosecution. Moreover, the
public interest is served in ensuring that congressional regulation
of interstate commerce supercedes conflicting and contradictory
state regulations. Finally, there is no suggestion of inequitable
conduct by plaintiffs, or that granting plaintiffs such an
injunction would in any way be inequitable. Accordingly,
plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. See
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505
(1974).
The Court is well aware of the ramifications of its findings.
The Congress, while attempting to reduce the commission of crimes
with toy guns, has removed from the states the ability to prohibit
the sale of more dangerous, high-powered air guns, some of which
appear capable of inflicting serious bodily injury or death. There
is no dispute that the Congress may exercise such power under the
Commerce Clause however, and the wisdom or desirability of such an
exercise is an issue for the Congress and not this Court.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION RE: INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNLOADED,
INACCESSIBLE WEAPONS
Plaintiffs Covey and Mohler contend that the recent amendments
to New Jersey's gun control law are preempted by the federal
statute providing for the interstate transportation of firearms. 18
U.S.C. section 926A. The federal statute provides, in essence,
that anyone may transport, firearms from one state in which they
are legal, through another state in which they are illegal, to a
third state in which they are legal, provided the firearms are
transported in a prescribed, safe manner. [footnote 14] Plaintiffs
argue that, under the recent amendments, they may be arrested for
transporting firearms through New Jersey, even though they have
complied with the federal statute. In support, they rely on the
affidavit of the police chief of Lebanon Township, in which he
avers:
I am aware that there is some federal law that provides
an exception whereby interstate travellers may travel with an
unloaded gun locked in their trunk, but so far as I am aware,
that would not make them an less subject to arrest in New
Jersey either under the new Act or under previous New Jersey
gun laws. If the federal law provides them some sort of
defense, that is up to the prosecutor and/or judge in the
court in which they are arraigned.
Aff. of Harry C. Creveling at para. 5.
The Attorney General argues that the federal law does not
preempt state gun control laws, and that, consequently, there is no
conflict between section 926A and the new amendments. The Attorney
General further argues that, although the new statute does not have
a provision expressly recognizing that the statute is subject to
preemption by federal law, no such requirement is needed, as the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause provides such a guarantee.
The Attorney General's position on this point is persuasive.
A straightforward reading of section 926A demonstrates that the
statute prohibits only regulation of the interstate transport of
firearms, and in no way restricts a state's power to regulate
firearms within the state. See Oefinger v. Zimmerman, 601 F.Supp.
405, 412 (W.D. Pa.1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.1985). Indeed,
in section 927, the Congress clearly expressed its intent not to
occupy the field of intrastate gun control regulation:
No provision of this chapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the
field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the
law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is
a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the
law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or
consistently stand together.
18 U.S.C. section 927. The Court sees no conflict between section
926A and New Jersey 's recently amended gun control law. The risk
that a person transporting firearms in accordance with section 926A
will be arrested in New Jersey for possessing an illegal firearm or
magazine is the same risk that person encounters whenever he or she
drives through a state where such weapons are illegal. For
plaintiffs' predicted irreparable injury to become realized, law
enforcement officers throughout New Jersey would have to disregard
the federal law in its entirety. The threat of such arguably
random and unauthorized acts is speculative at best, and does not
constitute irreparable injury, the Lebanon police chief's affidavit
notwithstanding. [footnote 15] Moreover, the Court is aware of no
requirement that the New Jersey law must contain an express
acknowledgement of the Supremacy Clause and preemptive legislation
in order to pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, plaintiffs'
interstate transportation claim must fail as a matter of law, and
will be dismissed. An order consistent with this opinion will be
entered.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in this Court's opinion filed this
day, August 15, 1990;
IT IS ORDERED that the Court does hereby abstain from decision
under Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct.
643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), as to the first claim of plaintiff's
complaint, until such time that either party can demonstrate that
the underlying issues of state law have been resolved in the first
instance by the New Jersey state courts, or that further abstention
is otherwise unwarranted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction be and is hereby granted in part; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, their employees, officers,
and/or agents be and are hereby preliminarily enjoined from
enforcement of or prosecution under, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j), and
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(h) against any and all owners of semi-automatic B-
B or pellet-firing air guns whose guns contain non-detachable
magazines in excess of fifteen (15) rounds; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, their employees, officers,
and/or agents be and are hereby preliminarily enjoined from
enforcement of, or prosecution under, N.J S.A. 2C:39-5(f) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(g) against any and all owners of semi-automatic B-
B or pellet-firing air guns whose guns are designed to be fired
from the: shoulder, and have either a magazine capacity in excess
of six (6) rounds, a folding stock, or a pistol grip; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction be and is hereby denied in all other respects; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' interstate travel claim be
and is hereby dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
FOOTNOTES
1. Plaintiffs, are the Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc.; the
National Rifle Association of America; the Congress of Racial
Equality; the New Jersey Firearms and Sporting Goods Dealers
Association, Inc. and its president Robert Viden; Law Enforcement
for Preservation of the Second Amendment, a non-profit organiza-
tion; Preston K. Covey and David G. Mohler, individual firearm
owners who transport their guns through New Jersey; and various un-
named residents of New Jersey who own large capacity magazines.
2. The statute defines large capacity magazine as "a box, drum,
tube or other container which is capable of holding more than 15
rounds of ammunition to be fed continuously and directly therefrom
into a semiautomatic firearm." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(y).
3. Weapons are defined under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r) as "anything
readily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily
injury. The term includes, but is not limited to . . . (2) compo-
nents which can be readily assembled into a weapon . . . ."
4. If the magazines were detachable and not an integral part of a
firearm not otherwise regulated under the New Jersey statute, then
only the magazine would be banned, not the firearm. The ban on
large capacity magazines in such instances would not be preempted
under section 5001(g), as such magazines are neither traditional B-
B, paint-ball, or pellet-firing air guns.
5. The following definitions derive from American Society for
Testing and Materials ("ASTM") Standard F 589-85, Standard Consumer
Safety Specification for Non-Powder Guns (June 28, 1985),
incorporated by reference in 15 C.F.R. section 1150.1, as well as
ASTM Standard F 590-84, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for
Non-Powder Gun Projectiles and Propellants (reapproved 1989),
referenced in ASTM F 589-84 section 2. 1. See also Toy Guns:
Involvement in Crime & Encounters With Police, U.S. Justice Dept.
Bureau of Justice Statistics (June 1990), a research project
mandated by the United States Congress P.L. 100-615 [15 U.S.C.
section 5001(c)].
6. Neither party asserts that the federal preemptive provision
concerning paint-ball guns is implicated here. Such guns do not
appear to be covered by the New Jersey statute which defines a
"weapon" as "anything readily capable of lethal use or of
inflicting serious bodily injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r). As the
comments of Rep. Dingell make clear, the paint-ball guns excluded
from state regulation include those for marking trees and for
playing paintball games, activities which apparently do not, and
are designed not to, create a risk of serious bodily injury or
death.
7. Department of Commerce regulations are afforded great deference
in statutory interpretation. Cf. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S.
79, 59 S.Ct. 45, 83 L.Ed. 52 (1938).
8. While one may suggest that Commerce's reading was overly
expansive in that standard F 589-85 arguably covers "non-
traditional" as well as "traditional" B-B guns, this Court does not
have before it any evidence from which such a distinction can be
made, and does not consider the argument at this time.
9. The statute provides an exception for "any look-alike,
nonfiring, collector replica of an antique firearm developed prior
to 1898, or traditional B-B, paint-ball, or pellet-firing air guns
that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure." 15
U.S.C. section 5001(c).
10. These organizations apparently supported this bill in
preference to one introduced by Representative Levine of
California, H.R. 3433, which would have banned such devices
altogether.
11. Such firearms include the Air Arms Firepower K-Carbine Standard
Air Rifle, a weapon modelled after the M-16 assault rifle, that
comes available with a 35-shot auto-load system. From 1987 to
1988, Crosman manufactured and sold its Z-77, a carbon-dioxide-
powered replica of the Uzi submachine gun.
12. Examples of such pistols include the Crosman 338 Auto Pistol,
an air-powered B-B pistol with a 20-shot magazine and the
Daisy/Youth Line Model 1500 Pistol, a B-B pistol with a 60-shot
reservoir and a gravity feed magazine.
13. To qualify for a permit to carry a handgun under this
provision, the applicant must fill out an application, and have it
endorsed by three reputable persons who have known the applicant
for at least three years preceding the date of application. The
applicant then must be fingerprinted by the chief police officer in
the municipality where he or she resides and must give the police
chief a complete description of each handgun he or she intends to
carry. Applicants who have been convicted of a crime, who suffer
from drug addiction, mental illness, alcoholism, or from any
disability that makes it unsafe to handle firearms, or who are
under the age of eighteen, or who, in the state's discretion, pose
a risk to the public health, safety or welfare, may not receive
such a license. If the applicant does not fall into one of these
prohibited categories, he or she may be entitled to a permit if he
or she is "thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of
handguns, and ... has a justifiable need to carry a handgun." If a
license is issued, the applicant must pay a permit fee of $20.
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.
14. The statute provides in full:
Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or
regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any
person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to
transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he
may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place
where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during
such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the
firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible
or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such
transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle
without a compartment separate from the driver's compartment the
firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container
other than the glove compartment or console. 18 U.S.C. section
926A.
15. Based on the police chief's affidavit, plaintiffs arguably
could seek a preliminary injunction against him. The police chief,
however, is not a named defendant, and therefore this issue is not
before the Court.