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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1682-11T1

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION

FOR A NEW JERSEY PERMIT TO CARRY

A HANDGUN BY RICHARD PANTANO.

__________________________________

Submitted October 23, 2012 - Decided

Before Judges Messano, Ostrer and Kennedy.

On appeal from the New Jersey Superior

Court, Law Division, Monmouth County, G.P.

App. No. 2011-01.

Evan F. Nappen, P.C., attorneys for appellant

Richard Pantano (Richard V. Gilbert, on the

brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth

County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent

State of New Jersey (Patricia B. Quelch,

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the

brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

Richard Pantano appeals from the trial court's October 31,

2011 denial of his application for a permit to carry a firearm

under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. The Manalapan Township Police Chief had

approved Pantano's application in December 2010 and the State

appealed. In a written opinion, Judge Francis P. DeStefano

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

February 22, 2013

APPELLATE DIVISION

February 22, 2013

2 A-1682-11T1

concluded after a testimonial hearing that Pantano had not

demonstrated "a justifiable need to carry a handgun." N.J.S.A.

2C:58-4(d). Pantano asserts the court erred in finding no

justifiable need, and, in the alternative, he argues the

justifiable need requirement infringes his right to bear arms

under the Second Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. II. We affirm.

I.

We first address Pantano's challenge to the court's finding

there was no justifiable need. We discern the following facts

from the record.

Pantano owns a landscape supply business with annual gross

receipts of $12 million, of which close to $2 million is paid in

cash. At the hearing, Pantano testified about the typical

transaction in his business:

[A] contractor would come in and order,

place an order for the materials he would

need. Most of the time the materials are

paver materials which are heavy,

neighborhood of 2,000 pounds per pallet, so

it's unrealistic for the contractor to be

able to pick up his material. So our

delivery system is what we use to take the

materials to the contractor.

Most of the contractors today are

working on very tight budgets, and they're

working with cash much more than ever. So

we are now delivering the product a lot of

times after hours when the contractors

receive their deposits from the homeowners,

[who] tend to be home between 5:00 and 7:00

p.m.

3 A-1682-11T1

Pantano explained that he personally delivered materials.

He would exchange paperwork and receive cash payments, sometimes

ranging between $7000 to $18,000, which he would count in front

of the customer and the customer's employees, some day-workers

with whom even the customer was not familiar. He testified that

while most of his deliveries were in Monmouth, Ocean and

Middlesex Counties, he traveled throughout the State and

sometimes outside it. He sought the permit to protect himself —

as opposed to his cash — from a potential robbery. His concern

was heightened by the state of the economy; he believed people

were more desperate and willing to resort to crime. He was also

concerned because many individuals, some strangers, were aware

of when and where he would be in possession of large amounts of

cash, creating repeated opportunities for a robbery.

Pantano explained that his willingness to "work[ ] with the

contractor" by accepting cash and making deliveries at the

customers' convenience, which many companies did not do, helped

boost his business's growth. He stated that if he required

payment in advance, by non-cash means, or at his office after

delivery, some customers either would decline to do business

with him or fail to pay him for the goods sold. He deposited

cash at his bank as many as two or three times a day. Pantano

asserted it would be impracticable to hire a security guard

4 A-1682-11T1

because he could not predict when a contractor would call for an

immediate delivery of supplies.

Pantano admitted that he had not been attacked nor had he

been specifically threatened. However, his father was once the

victim of an armed robbery and was stabbed.1 Pantano also

testified about an apparent trespasser at his business four

years earlier. It was dark, around 7:30 p.m., and he had

returned from a delivery and a cash receipt. Pantano recounted:

I had just finished up my paperwork and

one of my managers drove by and saw the

lights on in the office so he had stopped in

on me. As he approached the office he heard

all kinds of scattling and stuff getting

knocked over. At that point I happened to

be walking out, and he said, Hey, hey, hey,

someone's behind the building.

Turns out there was somebody or persons

apparently hiding behind the building, and

when he approached, they were startled.

They knocked over a whole bunch of material

and fled. So we called Manalapan Police

Department. They responded and they brought

the dog out. The dog had gone on the scent

trail, tracked it back through our nursery

in the fields, and lost them somewhere.

Pantano testified that the police chief, who was a personal

friend, had recommended he apply for the permit. "He actually

1 Judge DeStefano limited Pantano from testifying about the armed

robbery of his father, as the judge stated he was already aware

of the incident. "I heard the story. I understand his father

was robbed, he was knifed." In his decision, the judge noted

that Pantano's father "ran a similar business."

5 A-1682-11T1

was the one that told me I should apply. He understands my

business, he's seen it grow. He understands it. He knows me

personally, and he recommended that I apply for a handgun

permit."

Judge DeStefano found that the nature of Pantano's practice

of receiving large quantities of cash under the circumstances

did not create a justifiable need. The judge also relied on the

regulations defining "justifiable need" to mean "urgent

necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats

or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the

applicant's life that cannot be avoided by means other than by

issuance of a permit to carry a handgun." See N.J.A.C. 13:54-

2.4(d). Citing In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564 (1990), he explained

"[g]eneralized fears for personal safety are inadequate, as is

the need to protect property alone." The judge found the

apparent trespassing incident, and the robbery and assault of

Pantano's father, did not alter his conclusion.

Petitioner has f[a]iled to provide the court

with any specific threats, concerns, or

previous attacks that constitute an "urgent

need for self protection." The incident

that was alleged to occur four years ago is

insufficient to establish a justifiable need

to carry a handgun. It is unclear what the

intentions of this alleged trespasser were

and this Court is not going to base its

analysis on purely speculative claims.

Petitioner needs to provide specific threats

and simply asserting that an unknown person

6 A-1682-11T1

was outside the building after business

hours is not enough. In addition,

petitioner's concerns for his safety that

stem from the unfortunate incident with his

father do not rise to the level of a

"justifiable need." Petitioner's concerns,

although genuine, stem from the attack on

his father. There is nothing to show that

such attack is imminent or likely to happen

to petitioner himself. Therefore, petitioner

does not have any justifiable need to secure

a permit to carry.

On appeal, Pantano argues the court erred in rejecting his

claim of justifiable need. In particular, he argues the court

should have deferred to the police chief's decision to approve

his application. We disagree.

We are bound to accept the trial court's fact findings if

supported by substantial credible evidence. In re Return of

Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 (1997). However, we

review the trial court's legal determinations de novo.

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995); In re Sportsman's Rendezvous Retail Firearms

Dealer's License, 374 N.J. Super. 565, 574-75 (App. Div. 2005)

(stating court exercises de novo review of trial court's

statutory construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2).

Judge DeStefano correctly described the legal test for

establishing justifiable need. Pantano must show an urgent

necessity to carry a handgun for self-protection. Preis, supra,

118 N.J. at 571; Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 557 (1971).

7 A-1682-11T1

"The requirement is of specific threats or previous attacks

demonstrating a special danger to the applicant's life that

cannot be avoided by other means." Preis, supra, 118 N.J. at

571. The court must consider the justifiable need on a case-bycase

basis. Id. at 576.

We discern no grounds to disturb Judge DeStefano's finding

that Pantano failed to show justifiable need. Pantano attempts

to distinguish his situation from those found insufficient in

Siccardi, supra; In re Application of "X", 59 N.J. 533 (1971);

In re Application of Borinsky, 363 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div.

2003); and Doe v. Dover Twp., 216 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div.

1987). Pantano argues that in those cases, the applicant had

available an alternative to carrying a handgun for selfprotection,

by obtaining a police escort as in Siccardi and

Application of "X", or altering the applicant's activities as in

Borinsky, or the applicant, as in Doe, simply did not face the

same level of threat as did Pantano.

We are unpersuaded. Pantano was also able to avoid the

perceived risk of robbery. His situation did not "differ

materially" from that of other business-owners "who carry

substantial funds on their persons, often in high crime areas."

Application of "X", supra, 59 N.J. at 534. Pantano readily

conceded that his competitors do not accommodate customers'

8 A-1682-11T1

reported desire to pay cash for deliveries at odd hours.

Moreover, his claim that retaining a security escort was

infeasible was conclusory. He presented no evidence that his

business, which grossed over $12 million a year, could not

reasonably afford protective services. There also was

sufficient support in the record for Judge DeStefano's

conclusion that Pantano faced no specific threat, notwithstanding

the trespass incident and the robbery of his father.

We also reject Pantano's argument that the trial court

erred in not extending sufficient deference to the police

chief's decision to approve the permit. Pantano relies on In re

Application of Boyadjian, 362 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div.),

certif. denied, 178 N.J. 250 (2003). We held that while a trial

court reviews de novo a police chief's denial of a firearms

purchaser identification card (FPIC), the court "must,

nevertheless act with appropriate regard for the local interest

factor to the extent legitimately reflected in the police

chief's denial, as well as for the chief's 'investigative

experience and . . . expertise[.]'" Id. at 476 (quoting Weston

v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 46 (1972)).

For several reasons, Pantano's argument is inapposite.

First, the chief did not testify nor was the court apparently

presented with the chief's reasons for approving the

9 A-1682-11T1

application. Thus, there was no evidence of a reasoned exercise

of experience and expertise for the court to consider. Cf.

Weston, supra, 60 N.J. at 46 (discussing that typically, the

chief would testify as to the reasons for denying a FPIC).

Second, deference is unwarranted under the circumstances.

Pantano claimed the chief was a personal friend, was aware of

information about Pantano's business outside the record of the

permit application, and recommended that Pantano apply for the

permit. While we recognize the chief did not testify, Pantano's

undisputed assertions provide reasonable grounds to question the

decision-maker's objectivity. Cf. Brady v. Dep't of Personnel,

149 N.J. 244, 256 (1997) (stating that deference to agency

decision is limited if agency decision based on undisclosed

evidence); Kane Props., L.L.C. v. City of Hoboken, 423 N.J.

Super. 49, 65 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that deference not due a

municipal decision if "proceedings [were] tainted by conflict of

interest"), certif. granted, 209 N.J. 597 (2012).

Third, the process for granting a FPIC, discussed in

Boyadjian, differs from the process for granting a permit to

carry, as requested here. The chief is authorized to issue the

FPIC, subject to court action if there is an appeal. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(d). By contrast, although the chief may

approve an application for a permit to carry, only the court may

10 A-1682-11T1

actually issue the permit. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d); see also

Preis, supra, 118 N.J. at 569 (referring to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4,

"So concerned is the Legislature about this licensing process

that it allows only a Superior Court judge to issue a permit,

after applicants first obtain approval from their local chief of

police.").

II.

Pantano also renews before us his argument that application

of the justifiable need requirement infringed his constitutional

right to bear arms.

Judge DeStefano rejected Pantano's claim. He concluded New

Jersey courts "have failed to extend the holding of [District of

Columbia v.] Heller [554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed.

2d 637 (2008)] beyond its possession within the home for self

defense," citing In re Dubov, 410 N.J. Super. 190 (App. Div.

2009), Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J. Super. 25 (App. Div. 2009),

aff'd, 201 N.J. 207 (2010), and two unpublished decisions. In

Heller, the United States Supreme Court overturned a District of

Columbia statute that totally prohibited handgun possession in

the home. Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-

22, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 683. The Supreme Court later held that the

Second Amendment right is "fully applicable" to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago,

11 A-1682-11T1

___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894, 904

(2010). Judge DeStefano concluded, "Since the challenged

statute only regulates the carrying of a handgun outside the

home, it does not infringe upon any conduct protected by the

Second Amendment[.]"

On appeal, in urging us to find a constitutional violation,

Pantano relies on Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462

(D. Md. 2012), and its interpretation of Heller, supra. The

Woollard court held that Heller "left unanswered" whether the

Second Amendment's protections extend beyond the home, "'where

the need for defense of self, family, and property is most

acute.'" Woollard, supra, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (quoting

Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 171 L. Ed.

2d at 679). The Woollard court found that the Second Amendment

right to bear arms applied outside the home, that state

limitations on the right to carry were subject to intermediate

scrutiny, and that Maryland's right-to-carry law, which arguably

imposed less stringent requirements than N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4,

failed to survive intermediate scrutiny. Woollard, supra, 863

F. Supp. 2d at 468, 474. Pantano urges us to reach a similar

result here.

We decline to do so. We begin with the premise that

"statutes are presumed constitutional[.]" Whirlpool Properties,

12 A-1682-11T1

Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 208 N.J. 141, 175 (2011). We

also hesitate to find a constitutional infirmity absent clear

expression of the law from the United States Supreme Court,

particularly where it would disturb settled law. Id. at 176

(declining to abandon legal standard, despite "measure of

uncertainty," where there was "no ready or clear indication that

the [united States] Supreme Court has signaled its

abandonment").

In Dubov, supra, we concluded that Heller did not affect

the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3©(5).

The issue in Heller was whether the Second

Amendment protects only the right to possess

and carry a firearm in connection with

military service or also protects an

individual's right to possess a firearm for

other purposes such as self-defense and

hunting. The Court held that the Second

Amendment protects an individual right to

keep and bear firearms, and that this

holding required invalidation of District of

Columbia statutes that totally prohibited

handgun possession in the home and required

any lawful firearm in the home to be

disassembled or bound by a trigger lock,

thus rendering it inoperable.

However, the Court expressly indicated

that its holding did not require

invalidation of statutes that require a

license to purchase or possess a firearm.

In fact, the Court noted that "[r]espondent

conceded at oral argument that he does not

'have a problem with . . . licensing, and

that the District's law is permissible so

long as it is 'not enforced in an arbitrary

and capricious manner[,]'" thus obviating

13 A-1682-11T1

the need for the Court to address the

validity of the specific provisions of the

District of Columbia's gun licensing

statutes. Therefore, Heller has no impact

upon the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3©(5).

[410 N.J. Super. at 196-97 (citations

omitted).]

By the same reasoning, Heller would not affect the

constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. See Crespo, supra, 408

N.J. Super. at 42 ("[T]he majority opinion [in Heller] should

not be taken 'to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as

schools and government buildings[.] . . .'") (emphasis added)

(quoting Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17,

171 L. Ed. 2d at 678).

The federal district court in New Jersey has concluded that

our state law governing permits to carry handguns does not

"burden any protected conduct" under the Second Amendment.

Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 829 (D.N.J. 2012).

The court concluded that Heller addressed only the right to bear

arms in the home.

Heller's recognition of the right to "bear"

arms as a right to "carry" does not

inexorably lead to the conclusion that there

is a general right to carry arms outside the

home. Instead, this definition simply serves

to emphasize the nature of the right as an

14 A-1682-11T1

individual right to carry "for a particular

purpose - confrontation." Heller, 554 U.S.

at 584, 128 S. Ct. 2783. Heller found that

the individual right to carry a firearm for

confrontation was obviously not an

"unlimited" right to carry "for any sort of

confrontation," but included a right to

carry a handgun "for self-defense in the

home." Id. at 595, 636, 128 S. Ct. 2783.

The District of Columbia could not require

that a handgun be kept inoperable in the

home and could not "prevent a handgun from

being moved throughout one's house." Id. at

584, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (quoting Parker v.

District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400

(D.C. Cir. 2007)).

The language of Justice Scalia's

majority opinion deliberately limited the

scope of the right recognized to the home.

[id. at 821.]

Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,

Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169, 1177 (Md. 2010) (holding

that a statute prohibiting carrying a handgun outside the home

without a permit was not at odds with Heller or McDonald), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 93, 181 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2011);

Commonwealth v. Perez, 952 N.E.2d 441, 451 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)

("The Second Amendment does not protect the defendant in this

case because he was in possession of the firearm outside his

home."); see also Dorr v. Weber, 741 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1004-05

(N.D. Iowa 2010) ("The Court's recognition, in Heller, that

prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful was in

full accord with long-standing Supreme Court precedent.")

15 A-1682-11T1

(citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S. Ct. 326, 41 L.

Ed. 715 (1897)).

Other courts have observed that the application of the

Second Amendment to possession of firearms outside the home is

at least uncertain. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of

Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) ("What we know . . .

is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within

the home. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. What we do not know is

the scope of that right beyond the home and the standards for

determining when and how the right can be regulated by a

government."), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Kachalsky v.

Cacace, 81 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2013) (No. 12-845);

Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012)

(declining to resolve the issue, but noting varying approaches

to it among state and federal courts); United States v.

Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.) (stating "[t]here may

or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the

home," and that "[o]n the question of Heller's applicability

outside the home environment, we think it prudent to await

direction from the Court itself"), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756,

181 L. Ed. 2d 482 (2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d

85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that much of the scope of the

Second Amendment right remains unsettled).

16 A-1682-11T1

The Second Circuit in Kachalsky proceeded to assume that

New York's law burdened the Second Amendment right to bear arms,

and considered whether it passed constitutional scrutiny. Like

New Jersey's statutory requirement of "justifiable need,"

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d), the New York law requires a person seeking

an unrestricted permit to carry a concealed handgun in public to

show "proper cause," N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f). New York

courts have construed that law to require proof of a "'special

need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the

general community or of persons engaged in the same

profession.'" Kachalsky, supra, 701 F.3d at 92 (citation

omitted). Despite the burden placed on the permit applicant,

the court held New York's "proper cause" requirement was

constitutional after applying an intermediate level of scrutiny.

Id. at 93-101.2 The court held, "Restricting handgun possession

in public to those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a

lawful purpose is substantially related to New York's interests

2 We recognize that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently

held that the Second Amendment extends to the right to carry a

handgun outside the home. Moore v. Madigan, ___ F.3d ___, ___

(7th Cir. 2012) (slip op. at 28-29). In setting aside an

Illinois law that banned concealed carrying of weapons, the

court contrasted the Illinois law with New York's law held

constitutional in Kachalsky. Id. at 25-26.

17 A-1682-11T1

in public safety and crime prevention." Id. at 98. The same

may be said of New Jersey's law and interests.

In sum, given the presumption of our law's

constitutionality, the lack of clarity that the Supreme Court in

Heller intended to extend the Second Amendment right to a state

regulation of the right to carry outside the home, and the

Second Circuit's explicit affirmation of a law similar to ours,

we affirm Judge DeStefano's determination that Pantano's

constitutional rights were not infringed.

Affirmed.

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Please, Ive been abrasive enough, and still my plan to get gun owners to make specific threats against me hasnt worked, come on guys, I need threats to get my carry license! Oh well, guess that little corner of my house interior, from which I cant retreat any further, is where my right begins and ends.

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So...

 

The Woollard court found that the Second Amendment

right to bear arms applied outside the home, that state

limitations on the right to carry were subject to intermediate

scrutiny, and that Maryland's right-to-carry law, which arguably

imposed less stringent requirements than N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4,

failed to survive intermediate scrutiny. Woollard, supra, 863

F. Supp. 2d at 468, 474. Pantano urges us to reach a similar

result here.

We decline to do so.

 

Yet...

 

 

The language of Justice Scalia's

majority opinion deliberately limited the

scope of the right recognized to the home.

[id. at 821.]

Other courts have reached the same conclusion.

 

 

And further...

 

Therefore, Heller has no impact

upon the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3©(5).

 

So basically, to sum up.

 

1. The Heller decision has no impact on the NJ statutes in question YET

2. Other courts have said it does apply outside the home. So we will ignore those and INSTEAD

3. Agree with decisions that mirror our own opinions.

 

Yep, selectively chose which decisions and opinions you want admittedly even if they are not relevant while ignoring onces that admittedly may be. Hooray.

 

My favorite is that despite USSC rulings (as grey as they may be) they just elected to go with the "our laws are presumably constitutional" line. Got to love it.

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I long for the day when a federal court will slap the @#%! out of NJ's judicial system over their firearms rulings.

 

(many people are worried about when the "shtf", in our state it's even worse because our fan is made of sh!t.)

-excuse my french.

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If the state is so confident that nothing is going to happen to you if they deny a CCW... then perhaps they wouldn't mind paying to insure the applicant for $10 million dollars if they subsequently fall victim to a crime where the result is injury or death?

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It read to me like clearly passing the buck. Appeal this decision and see to it the the ussc rules that justifiable need clauses in life sure for carry are a violation of second amendment guarantees to the RTKBA. Our law is different than dc law which was different from md law so those decisions don't negate our law. We aren't willing to do the heavy lifting of establishing case law for nj and defer to the higher court.

 

I don't see this as a bad thing necessarily given the outcome of heller and macdonald.

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I long for the day when a federal court will slap the @#%! out of NJ's judicial system over their firearms rulings.

 

(many people are worried about when the "shtf", in our state it's even worse because our fan is made of sh!t.)

-excuse my french.

 

It's coming sooner than you think. There's a case currently being heard in the FEDERAL courts that looks VERY promising for us about New Jersey's concealed carry.

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The main problem is that NOBODY applies! And the reason: NOBODY wants to have to be forced to check-off that square where it asks if you've ever been turned-down for a gun permit! It doesn't specify a CCW, just a "Gun Permit".

 

WTF would happen if everybody in NJ that owns a hand gun would apply on the same day? Do you think it would make a statement??

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NJ will never allow its citizens to carry a gun concealed outside of their home unless they say so and the person has already survived a violent encounter. I moved and although I know that is not a practical solution for a lot of you, I took the opportunity to do so the first chance I got. It infuriates me that the State of NJ will only issue a permit after the damage is done. That is so stupid to make me question the intelligence of all elected and appointed officials. Down here in Florida, despite the national publicity of the Zimmerman case, the Governor's appointed commission did not recommend any changes to our Stand Your Ground Law other than clarify it so that LEO do not let people go because they are uncertain of when it can be used. No mention of any gun control at all and in fact we recently saw our millionth CCW license issued. Just a few weeks ago my cousin's wife was in a hotel and someone opened the door with a passkey and tried to force his way in. Luckily the inside bolt was strong and despite his efforts he was unable to break open the door. Now I do not seem like a paranoid gun nut to her anymore. You may only get one shot at saving your life and it is a shame that some dumbasses require that you survive that before considering issuing a concealed carry permit.

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" The judge also relied on the

regulations defining "justifiable need" to mean "urgent

necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats

or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the

applicant's life that cannot be avoided by means other than by

issuance of a permit to carry a handgun." See N.J.A.C. 13:54-

2.4(d). Citing In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564 (1990), he explained

"[g]eneralized fears for personal safety are inadequate, as is

the need to protect property alone.""

 

So, based on the definition above, what if you are a woman who has just been raped by your boyfriend, who continues to menace you at work and at home? You are living on minimum wage, so obviously cannot afford a Bloomberg-style entourage of armed guards, and you do not have any other job offers, besides the one where you work. So, your boyfriend knows exactly where to find you.

 

Does that constitute "justifiable need?" There must be cases where such women have applied and been denied. That might be a more sympathetic case and would be interesting to see what judicial gymnastics would be required to get around it.

 

I can already guess. Have a policeman meet her at work every day and escort her to a new secret home while watching for a tail, and doing the same for her kids, taking a circuitous route home, so the creep can't follow them home from school to find out where they live. Oh, and no play dates for the kids.

 

Or maybe he'll just tell her to vomit and piss herself next time.

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Looks like it was granted cert by the NJ Supreme Court. Hope for the best.

Is there any indication when it will be heard? Since it's a state issue is this the end of the road regarding appeals? Curious if it could get kicked up to SCOTUS.

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Is there any indication when it will be heard? Since it's a state issue is this the end of the road regarding appeals? Curious if it could get kicked up to SCOTUS.

 

I think it ends for the state courts once the state supreme court rules on it. That is separate from the federal courts so I don't think they could do anything. There would have to be a separate case at the federal level... but we are awaiting the ruling from Drake  v Filko which was argued in the 3rd circuit.

 

But no, state cases don't go to SCOTUS.

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